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Abstract
The vast advances in biometrics over the past several decades have brought with them a
host of pressing concerns. Philosophical scrutiny has already been devoted to many of the
relevant ethical and political issues, especially ones arising from matters of privacy, bias,
and security in data collection. But philosophers have devoted surprisingly little attention
to the relevant metaphysical issues, in particular, ones concerning matters of personal
identity. This paper aims to take some initial steps to correct this oversight. After dis-
cussing the philosophical problem of personal identity, the ways in which the notion of
biometric identity connects with, or fails to connect with, the philosophical notion of
personal identity is explored. Though there may be some good reasons to use biometric
identity to track personal identity, it is contended that biometric identity is not the same
thing as personal identity and thus that biometrics researchers should stop talking as if it
were.
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Biometric technologies have long since crossed over from the
realm of science fiction to the realm of the everyday. With over
1 billion iPhones currently in active use around the world, the
practice of being digitally recognised by one's fingerprint or by
one's face has become not only commonplace but completely
unremarkable.1 But even if a rapidly increasing number of
individuals use their thumb or face to unlock their phones
without a second thought, the vast advances in biometrics over
the past several decades can be seen to give rise to a host of
pressing concerns. Philosophical scrutiny has already been
devoted to many of the relevant ethical and political issues,
especially ones arising from matters of privacy, bias, and
security in data collection (see, e.g. Lyons [1] and Karkazis and
Fishman [2]). But philosophers have devoted surprisingly little
attention to the relevant metaphysical issues raised by bio-
metrics, in particular, ones concerning matters of personal
identity.2 This paper aims to take some initial steps in
correcting this oversight.
1 | THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM(S)
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
In a philosophical discussion, the phrase “the problem of
personal identity” refers not to a single problem but to a
cluster of related problems: the identification question, the
reidentification question, and the characterisation question.3
The identification question asks what properties a being
must have in order to count as a person. In this context,
philosophers take the notion of a person to be distinct from
the notion of a human being (see, e.g. Locke [8] where this
distinction originates). The notion of human is a biological
notion, defined in terms of facts relating to reproductive
isolation, genetics, and/or phylogenetics, but the notion of
person is not. Sometimes person is used as a legal notion and
sometimes as a moral notion, but here we will focus on its use
as a metaphysical notion. In any of these uses, however, it is
conceptually possible that there be non‐human persons, be
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3
See Kind [7] for an in‐depth discussion of these three questions. This source also contains numerous suggestions for further reading on philosophical debates about personal identity.
IET Biome. 2021;1–7. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/bme2 - 1
they sophisticated aliens from a distant world, higher mammals
in our own world or artificially intelligent systems of the future.
It is also conceptually possible that there be non‐person
humans. A corpse with human DNA is still a human, for
example, but a corpse is not a person. Other examples are
likely to be controversial, but the ones that are usually
considered involve humans at the very beginning and very end
of life. An embryo has human DNA but may not be a person,
and a human being with severe neurological damage who is in
an irreversible persistent vegetative state may not be a person.
In answering the identification question, philosophers attempt
to provide a framework for distinguishing the notion of human
from the notion of person, explicating the notion of person,
and adjudicating these examples like the ones just mentioned.
The identification question, in asking about a given identity
at one moment in time, is a synchronic question. In contrast,
the reidentification question is a diachronic one. It asks about
the identity of a person over time, and in particular, it asks
what makes a given person the same person over time (see
Locke [8]). For example, consider the individual in 1984
playing the role of The Terminator and the individual in 2003
who was the winner of the recall election for the office of
California governor, both of whom go by the name Arnold
Schwarzenegger. What makes these individuals the same
person? Answers to the reidentification question typically rely
on facts about psychology or facts about biology, either singly
or in combination with one another.
Though the identification question and the reidentification
question are distinct, certain kinds of answers to the reidenti-
fication question can be seen to presuppose certain kinds of
answers to the identification question and vice versa. For
example, answers to the reidentification question that rely
solely on facts about psychology go along with psychologically
based answers to the identification question. On some
psychologically based answers to the identification and rei-
dentification questions, two individuals separated in time might
be the same human without being the same person and vice
versa. Consider an influential thought experiment from John
Locke in which the consciousness of a prince and a cobbler
were to be swapped. Should this happen, Locke says, then
when we consider the body of the cobbler, “everyone sees that
he would be the same person as the prince, accountable only
for the prince’s actions; but who would say it was the same
man [i.e, human]?” [8].
The last of the three questions, the characterisation
question, asks what makes a given person the person that they
are. Rather than focus on the notion of identity as sameness, as
in the reidentification question, the characterisation question
focuses on the notion of identity as self. Among the many
characteristics that an individual has, some of them seem more
central to that individual's identity, to who they are, than others
do. In exploring which characteristics of a person are those that
go towards making them who they are, we are addressing the
characterisation question.
Though these three questions are different from one
another, notice that all three of them are metaphysical rather
than epistemological. They concern facts about the nature of a
person rather than about how we know those facts. So, the
identification question does not ask: “When encountering an
alien for the first time, how can we tell whether it’s a person?”
or “What would be the best test to use to determine whether
the alien is a person?” but rather, what makes it the case that
the alien is (or is not) a person. Likewise for the reidentification
question and the characterisation question—we are not asking
how we can tell that the 1984 individual is the same person as
the 2003 individual, or how we can tell which characteristics of
a given person are central to their identity.4 This will prove to
be crucially important as we turn to take a closer look at the
notion of biometric identity in Section 2.
2 | BIOMETRIC IDENTITY
Suppose one wants to determine who a given individual is or
verify that a given individual is who they say they are. This
process can proceed by various different methods. One might
rely on information that is meant to be known exclusively by
the given individual, as is the case with passwords or personal
identification numbers (PINs). This is a knowledge‐based
method. Alternatively, one might rely on some physical item
that is meant to be possessed exclusively by the given indi-
vidual, as is the case with passports, drivers' licences, or other
identification cards. This is a token‐based method. Though
these methods are importantly different from one another,
they both rely on what we might think of as “surrogate
representations of identity” [10, p. 2]. As such both methods
face significant problems. Surrogate representations of an
individual's identity need not be tightly connected to the
individual themselves. Passwords can be shared, forgotten, or
guessed by others. Passports can be lost, stolen, or forged.
The way that biometrics approaches the process of
recognition promises to avoid these problems. As defined by
the ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37 committee on biometrics in ISO/
IEC 2387‐37, biometrics is the “automated recognition of in-
dividuals based on their behavioural and biological character-
istics.”5 Anil Jain, Arun Ross, and Karthik Nandakumar give a
similar though slightly broader definition in their textbook,
Introduction to Biometrics: biometrics is “the science of
establishing the identity of an individual based on the physical
and/or behavioral characteristics of the person either in a fully
automated or a semi‐automated manner” [10, p. 2]; see also ref.
[11]. Rather than relying on passwords or passports, biometric
recognition relies on one or more of a varied set of indicators,
including fingerprint, palmprint, face, iris, retina, signature,
odour, or gait. As Jain and coauthors suggest, “Since the
biometric identifiers are inherent to an individual, it is more
difficult to manipulate, share, or forget these traits” [10, p. 2].
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One might hope that the answers to these metaphysical questions will shed light on the
epistemological matters. But they might not. For example, it might be that in ordinary life
we rely on both biological and psychological facts to adjudicate identity over time, even
though only one set of these facts is responsible for that identity. See also the discussion
of persistence versus evidence in Olson [9].
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This last claim that the biometric identifiers are “inherent
to an individual,” highlights an important potential disconnect
between the way that biometrics researchers are thinking about
these matters and the way that philosophers think about these
matters. For the philosopher, the question of whether the
biometric identifiers are really inherent to the individual will
depend on what the term “individual” refers to, in particular,
whether it refers to the person or to the human. As we have
seen, for the philosopher these are different notions. But that
does not seem to be the case for the biometrics researcher–or,
at least, as James Wayman [6] notes, their use of the term
“individual” might be seen as skirting this philosophical issue.
How might we sort this out? On the one hand [9, 10]
explicitly refer to the goal of biometrics as one of person
recognition, where the process of person recognition requires
one to “be able to determine a person's identity or verify the
identity claim of an individual whenever required.” This sug-
gests that “individual” should be understood as synonymous
with “person.” Traore et al [11] too refer to biometrics in terms
of the identification of a person. But, on the other hand, Traore
et al [11] also note that biometrics is “first and foremost about
the human body” (my emphasis). Wayman makes a similar
point: Given that biometrics involves behavioural and biological
characteristics, the field “clearly focuses on bodies and their
movements, ultimately equating them with individuals.”
[6, p. 30]. But bodily and biological characteristics do not
necessarily settle questions of person identity; rather, they seem
more relevant to questions of human identity. Moreover, in
laying out the biometrics standards, the international standards
committee explicitly notes that the field of biometrics uses the
word “individual” in such a way that it is “restricted in scope to
refer only to humans.” This would exclude any non‐human
persons from consideration in the discussion.6
Construing the goal of biometrics as one of person
recognition is thus philosophically misleading. But there are
further philosophical issues raised by the biometrics literature
that need to be uncovered as well. Consider, for example,
the following claims made by Jain et al:
The ability to identify individuals uniquely and to associate
personal attributes (e.g. name, nationality etc.) with an indi-
vidual has been crucial to the fabric of human society. Humans
typically use body characteristics such as face, voice, and gait
along with other contextual information (e.g. location and
clothing) to recognise one another. The set of attributes
associated with a person constitutes their personal identity
[10, p. 1].
In this passage, the term “personal identity” seems to be
used in a way that is very different from the way that philos-
ophers use the notion. One might try to argue that it picks out
the sense of personal identity used in the characterisation
question. But while the characterisation question does concern
personal attributes, including bodily characteristics, it focuses
on picking out those that are most central in making a person
who they are. Thus, it is only a subset of the full set of attri-
butes associated with a person that is relevant towards their
personal identity in the sense of the characterisation question.
Furthermore, there is no special reason to think that the kinds
of attributes mentioned by Jain et al—the kinds of attributes
on which biometrics focuses—would generally be among those
counted as most central. Were you to ask a given individual
which features make them who they are, it seems likely that
their responses would be more likely to cite features such as
their commitment to social justice, their religious devotion, or
their status as a veteran or a parent or orphan, than to features
such as their fingerprints and gait, or even their face.
Here, we also need to recall that biometrics is not con-
cerned with figuring out what features make you the person
that you are. Rather, it is interested in figuring out what
features make you recognisable as the person you are. In
diagnosing the disconnect between biometric identity and the
philosopher's notion of personal identity, then, we need to take
more seriously the fact that biometrics is engaged in a process
of biometric recognition. Recognition concerns questions
about the justification that we have for our beliefs about a
given person, not questions about the nature of the person
themselves. In short, recognition is an epistemological notion.
While philosophers engaged in questions of personal identity
are typically engaged in a metaphysical inquiry, researchers
taking up questions of biometric identity are typically engaged
in an epistemological inquiry. Perhaps it is to keep this clear
that Mordini advises that “identity is a notion full of meta-
physical implications, it should be handled with great care and
if possible avoided.” [4, p. 381].
That said, it would be a mistake to conclude that issues
about biometric recognition should be seen as completely
orthogonal to philosophical discussions of personal identity.7
Generally, it seems reasonable to expect one's epistemological
enquiries to rest on solid metaphysical foundations. To give just
one example, questions about the justification for our beliefs in
(and about) numbers depend on facts about the nature of
numbers. If one takes numbers to be physical objects akin to
rocks or cucumbers or pencils, then the justification of our
numerical beliefs would proceed in a manner akin to the
justification of our beliefs in (and about) physical objects. It is
precisely because numbers are not typically taken to be physical
in nature that epistemological questions about the domain of
numbers seem especially fraught.
There is good reason to push back a little here. Even if
numbers are nonphysical, one might think that we can none-
theless learn something about them and their nature by
interacting with purely physical things. Can't we learn that three
is a greater number than two by seeing that a group of three
rocks contains more things than a group of two rocks? Also,
can't we learn that four is an even number by seeing that a
6
There are a whole host of interesting issues here about biometric recognition of non‐
humans. For example, one might wonder what happens when you present a non‐human
thing to a human‐recognition system. At this time, the answer is unknown, since
biometric research has not really explored the issue. Thanks to a referee for raising this
point.
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The relationship between biometrics and philosophical discussions of personal identity
was addressed in the National Academics of Science, Engineering, and Medicine in their
2010 report Biometric Recognition: Challenges and Opportunities [12].
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group of four rocks can be evenly divided into two different
groups? So perhaps something similar occurs with respect to
biometrics, that is, even if persons are nonphysical, we might
be able to learn something about them and their nature by way
of physical facts about them.
Still, it often turns out that one's answers to epistemolog-
ical questions about a given subject matter are not neutral with
respect to the metaphysical questions, that is, they presuppose
certain answers to those questions. This, I think, is what
happens in the case of biometrics. To determine the success of
biometrics' epistemological approach to identity or at least to
determine this from a philosophical perspective, we thus need
to look more closely at its metaphysical presuppositions. In
particular, we need to ask what exactly they are and whether
and to what extent they are philosophically defensible.
3 | BIOMETRICS AND THE
REIDENTIFICATION OF PERSONS
Recall the three different questions (distinguished in Section 1)
that constitute the philosophical problem of personal identity:
the identification question, the reidentification question, and
the characterisation question. Part of our goal in looking more
closely at the notion of biometric identity was to determine to
which of these three questions it is most closely connected.
Given that biometric identity seems to be an epistemological
rather than a metaphysical notion, we cannot equate it to the
sense of personal identity utilised in any of these questions.
But, that said, it looks like the most natural connection to draw
is one between biometric identity and the sense of identity
employed by the reidentification question.
We have already seen why biometric identity is not a great
fit for the characterisation question, since the features picked
out by biometric recognition are not necessarily ones that are
central to an individual's sense of who they are. They also do
not seem to be the kinds of features that go towards making
something a person—or even the kinds of features that go
towards making something a human. Great apes like gorillas
and chimpanzees have fingerprints, as do koalas, and while the
Face ID technology used by Apple for their iPhones does not
currently work on animals, there are other facial recognition
technologies in use that do; to give just one example, Hau and
de Mitcheson [13] describe how one can use complex facial
patterns to pick out individual fish, specifically, humphead
wrasse. Moreover, even though many of the biometric identi-
fiers in use for humans do not apply directly to animals, there
are various analogues that are in various stages of development.
Canines might be recognized by way of nose prints rather than
fingerprints, cows and sheep by their muzzles, and bottlenose
dolphins by their dorsal fins.
While the connections between biometric recognition and
the identification and characterisation questions seem tenuous
at best, there does seem to be a much closer connection to the
reidentification question. The reidentification question asks
what makes a person the same person over time. Take an in-
dividual at a given time t1, call them A, and an individual at a
given time t2, call them B. The reidentification question can
thus be seen to ask: What makes A the same as B? The goal of
biometric recognition can be put in roughly parallel fashion:
How can we tell that A is the same as B? The parallelism is not
perfect, since the reidentification question should really be
clarified as: What makes A the same person as B, whereas the
question of biometric recognition is probably better put in
terms of the same human, especially in light of our discussion
above. But the rough parallel structure seems more than suf-
ficient to mark out a close and genuine connection here.
Philosophers have historically given three kinds of answers
to the reidentification question. The first kind of answer, often
called the further fact view, sees personal identity over time as
dependent on some further fact, typically a fact about the
existence of a soul. In an effort to streamline our discussion,
and since I do not want my conclusions to depend on matters
as dubious and controversial as the existence of souls, I here
set this view entirely aside.
The second view follows a tradition associated with John
Locke, whose work we briefly encountered earlier. Though
Locke himself was focussed specifically on facts about an in-
dividual's memory, most accounts in the Lockean tradition
look at an individual's psychology more broadly—for this
reason, they are called psychological theorists (or sometimes
psychological continuity theorists). What makes A the same
person as B is not just that B has first‐person memories of the
experiences of A, but also that A and B share continuity of
intentions, desires, beliefs, character traits, and so on. That is
not to say that all of the psychological features need to be
exactly the same—individuals form new intentions and desires,
they gain new beliefs and shed certain character traits—but it is
to say that there must be adequate continuity between the
psychological features of A and the psychological features of B.
The idea, roughly, is that there will be a significant overlap
between A and the next temporal stage A1, and then a sig-
nificant overlap between A1 and the next temporal stage A2…
all the way up to B, where there might no longer be a signif-
icant overlap with A, but where there will be a significant
overlap with the immediately preceding temporal stage. I
sometimes like to put the point in terms of an analogy to a
long braid of rope [7]. Even if it is the case that no single fibre
runs through the entire rope, the ends are connected by way of
a continuity of fibres, and we can thus see both ends as the
same rope.
In contrast to the psychological theory, the third view
focuses not on facts about psychology but on physical facts.
Unsurprisingly, its adherents are typically referred to as physical
theorists (or sometimes physical continuity theorists). There
are different versions of this view, some focussing on physical
facts relating to the body, some on physical facts relating to the
brain, and some on physical facts relating to the human
organism (or the human animal). These views are known as the
bodily continuity view, the brain continuity view, and
animalism, respectively. Though bodily continuity theories are
no longer popular, the other two views are considered to be
viable. For those adopting the brain continuity view, our
continued survival should be seen in terms of the survival of
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the brain. Even though brain cells die and new neural con-
nections are forged, as long as there is sufficient brain conti-
nuity, I continue to exist. For the animalist, our continued
survival should be seen in terms of the survival of the human
animal. As long as the same human animal exists, I exist. When
it ceases to exist, so do I. I am simply that human animal.8
When reflecting on these two different views, it seems
immediately clear that biometrics aligns better with a physical
theory than it does with psychological theories. After all, as
Mordini and Massari note, it is the ideal aim of biometrics to
“turn persons into mere living objects” [5, p. 494]—a claim
that sounds a lot like the animalist's assessment of personal
identity.9 Perhaps the biometrics researcher is completely un-
troubled by the outright dismissal of the psychological theory.
Perhaps this theory seems like an outdated vestige of pre‐20th
century supernaturalism. The biometrics researcher might take
the view proffered by van der Ploeg that the emphasis on
psychology in philosophical accounts of identity is “unwar-
ranted” and simply reflects philosophy's “longstanding denial
of the relevance of embodiment” to matters concerning per-
sonal identity [3, p. 40]. As I will suggest in the next (and final)
section, this kind of response would be a mistake. In short,
biometrics seems to be at odds with widely held beliefs that
what makes me the person I am has to do with my psychology,
not with my body.
4 | PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF
REIDENTIFICATION IN THE 21st
CENTURY
To see this, it is important to note that there are good reasons
to maintain a psychological theory even if one fully embraces
the naturalistic worldview of the 21st century. In fact, one
might think that it is in large part due to the vast technological
advances of the past 70 years or so—advances relating to
computers and artificial intelligences—that the psychological
theory has such continuing allure. Consider the fact that many
of today's leading technological innovators aspire to being able
one day to upload their consciousness to a machine. Inventor
and futurist Ray Kurzweil is a good case in point. Currently
serving as the director of engineering at Google, Kurzweil
predicts that we will be able to upload ourselves to a computer
or android body via a straightforward scan‐and‐transfer pro-
cedure as soon as the late 2030s. Other technologies involving
nanobots might allow for a more gradual transfer such that we
transition to a non‐biological being without ever even noticing.
Were he himself to undergo these procedures, Kurzweil
suggests that ‘There will be no “old Ray” and “new Ray”, just
an increasingly capable Ray’ [16, p. 202]. His personal identity
will be completely maintained. If this is the case, though, his
identity cannot consist in his body or in his being a certain
human organism, since he might not have a body and will no
longer be a biological organism at all.
In addition to the upload scenario, there are numerous
other hypothetical scenarios that point towards a psychological
approach to the reidentification question. To take just one
additional example, consider transporter‐like teleportation of
the sort depicted in Star Trek. One starts on a spaceship and
then is “beamed down” to a planet. There is no physical
continuity between the pre‐teleported individual and the post‐
teleported individual. The individual on the planet is made of
wholly different matter from the individual on the spaceship.
But given that the two individuals share psychological conti-
nuity in a very strong sense, we are inclined to view the indi-
vidual on the planet as the same person as the individual who
was on the spaceship. Someone might be queasy about
teleportation, but this queasiness surely derives from worries
about the reliability of the technology itself and not from
worries about the lack of physical continuity. Yet anyone in-
clined towards animalism would have to view such teleporta-
tion not as a fast means of travel but as a fast means of death!
In fact, the psychological theory has more adherents
among professional philosophers than any other views about
reidentification. In a survey conducted in 2009 of over 900
philosophy professors at leading universities throughout the
world, 34% claimed that they accepted or leaned towards some
kind of psychological approach, 17% claimed that they
accepted or leaned towards some kind of physical approach,
and 12% claimed that they accepted or leaned towards the
further fact view (The remaining 37% were either undecided,
did not feel they knew enough to answer the question, or
accepted another view.) While this is by no means decisive
support for the psychological theory, it nonetheless shows that
the view has twice as much support as physical theories like
animalism.10
Suppose that these 34% of professional philosophers are
right and the psychological theory is the correct answer to the
reidentification question. Does that mean that biometrics is
philosophically misguided? Though I think there is reason to
worry here, I also think that we can avoid an affirmative
answer to this question. There are three important points
worth considering.
First, we need to think more closely about the relationship
between biometrics and the physical theory. As I noted above,
biometrics seems closely aligned with this view. But I do not
think that means that biometrics needs to presuppose its truth.
Suppose, for example, that biological features and psycholog-
ical features closely covary with one another (or even track one
another). Of course, this does not seem at all plausible for
some biometric identifiers. It seems highly unlikely that one's
unique fingerprint patterns in any way covary with or track the
features underlying one's psychological continuity. But it seems
8
See McMahon [14] for one influential development of the brain continuity view. See
Olson [15] for one influential development of animalism.
9
Consider also the claim that, for the purposes of biometrics, “an individual can only be a
‘body’.” (Pato and Millett [12, p. 18])
10
Though I don't have survey results on the matter, I'd guess that the psychological theory
has even stronger support among the general public than it does among philosophers.
Consider, for example, the role that intent and other psychological states play in legal
proceedings or even in everyday interactions. Moreover, the psychological theory seems
presumed by a wide variety of plot lines in fiction and film.
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more plausible for some other biometric identifiers like face
and voice. It's perhaps even more plausible for some of
the behavioural identifiers used in biometrics. So it might be
argued that, even if the psychological theory is the correct
answer to the reidentification question discussed by philoso-
phers, the close connections between psychological features
and physical features make it good sense to use biometrics for
recognitional purposes. Though the biometric identifiers do
not play any role in making an individual at time t2 the same
person as an individual at time t1, they can nonetheless be
fruitful in allowing us to recognise whether an individual at
time t2 is the same person as an individual at time t1.
Moreover, it is not clear that we have any better means of
recognising psychological continuity (For relevant discussion,
see Brook [17]). In most cases, much of the evidence we have
for someone else's psychological continuity comes from what
they tell us. But of course, they might lie or be otherwise
deceptive. Perhaps we might also rely on someone's behaviour
to recognise psychological continuity. But here too there could
be deception.
Second, even if biological features do not covary with or
usefully track the psychological features, one might argue that
the same problem arises for other identity recognition systems
such as passports or drivers’ licences—or, more generally, for
any kinds of photo ID. A photo ID cannot track psychological
continuity. Certainly, it does no good in the kinds of situations
imagined above where individuals upload themselves to
computational systems. Of the systems currently in use,
knowledge‐based methods seem to be the only ones that
function by measuring something about psychological conti-
nuity rather than physical continuity. But even when there are
strong psychological connections between A at time t1 and B
at time t2, B might have forgotten the PIN that A chose.
Arguably, then, knowledge‐based methods do not seem to be
successful in providing the right kinds of measures of psy-
chological continuity. Thus, insofar as there is a need for
recognition systems, and insofar as we do not seem to have a
good way of measuring psychological continuity, one might
argue that the pragmatic considerations outweigh the meta-
physical ones. It is a philosophical trade off that must be made.
Here is another way to put the point: Recognitional systems
need not be anywhere near perfect in order to be extremely
useful to us. (Indeed, given its probabilistic nature, biometrics
does not even aim at perfection.) Even though biometrics
would get things wrong in the upload case, for example, it gets
things right in the vast majority of cases. So it may well be our
best bet.
Third, one might note that the kinds of cases where bio-
metrics will run into the most trouble—cases like the upload
scenario—are even on the most optimistic assessments still
likely to be more than a decade away. So, in line with the
previous points, we might think that given the current state of
play, (1) there is enough covariation between biometric features
and psychological features to make them highly reliable; and
(2) this is the highest degree of reliability we are presently
able to achieve. Once upload technology is nearing viability,
we will have to undertake a serious re‐evaluation of our
reidentification techniques. But until then, we can use bio-
metrics without much metaphysical worry.
My discussion of these three points was conducted against
the background assumption that the psychological theory is
correct. It is interesting to note, however, that at least some of
these issues would still arise even if we were to drop this
assumption. So suppose that the psychological theory is false
and that some version of physical theory is true, in particular,
the brain continuity theory. Even in this case, the biometric
facts might depart from the metaphysical facts. Consider the
frequently discussed transplant case. In this hypothetical
situation, we suppose that two individuals are in a horrible
accident such that one (call them C ) ends up with a fully
functioning body but a severely damaged brain, and the other
(call them D) ends up with a severely damaged body but a
fully functioning brain. Neurosurgeons take D's functioning
brain and transplant it into C 's body. When we consider the
individual with D's brain and C 's body, who is it? Is it C or is
it D? Most people have the very strong intuition that it is D
and that is also what the brain continuity theorist says.
According to most of the biometrics measures, however, the
individual is C.
Perhaps not all physical theorists have the same problem
here. Animalists will likely deny that the C‐body/D‐brain
individual is the same biological organism as D. So perhaps
animalism is able to match up with the biometric results in
this case, even if other physical theories cannot. But it does so
at the cost of having to deny the intuition that the individual
is D, an intuition for which there is extremely widespread
support.
It is time to take stock. As we have seen, the metaphysical
worries about biometrics cannot be easily dismissed as merely a
vestige of an outmoded sense of ourselves. The psychological
theory of personal identity is still alive and well in the 21st
century, and even if we focus on brain continuity rather than
psychological continuity, there can be disconnects between
biometric identity and personal identity. Put simply, biometric
identity is not the same thing as personal identity, and so
biometrics researchers should stop talking as if it were.
That said, however, the fact that biometric identity cannot
be equated with personal identity does not necessarily mean
that it cannot be used to track personal identity. If we focus on
biometric measures that nicely correlate with psychological
features, and if we work towards developing further such
measures going forward, then pragmatic considerations might
well come down decisively on the side of biometrics. Just as
one may well be able to address many of the ethical worries
about biometrics by way of careful attention to the relevant
issues, one might be able to address the metaphysical worries in
a similar fashion.
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